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Abstract: Does one have an obligation to keep one’s promises? I answer this question by 
distinguishing between two broad conceptions of promising. On the normativized conception of 
promising, a promise is made when an agent validly offers to undertake an obligation to the 
promisee to perform some act (i.e., give up a liberty-right in relation to her) and the promisee 
validly accepts the offer. Keeping such promises is morally obligatory by definition. On the non-
normativized conception, the nature of promising does not conceptually entail any connection 
with the obligation to keep promises. A promise might be understood, for example, as an 
assertion that one will do something along with special assurance that one will do so and an 
invitation to rely on that assurance. A particularly attractive and relevant non-normativized 
account of promising takes promising simply to be giving one’s word concerning one’s future 
conduct. So understood, it is plausible—as a substantive matter—that one has an obligation to 
(1) alert the promisee, if one realizes that he will not perform the promised action, (2) apologize 
and compensate the promisee, if one does not perform the action, but one has no obligation to 
perform the promised action. 
 
1. Introduction 
Does promising to perform some act generate a moral duty to the promisee to perform the 
promised act? One possibility is that the moral force of promising is limited to what is morally 
desirable (as opposed to required). Prior to the promise, there was, we may suppose, nothing 
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morally problematic about my failing to meet you at the theater. Once I promise to meet you 
there, however, I would not be acting virtuously if I were not to do so. This is surely correct, but 
it also seems grossly inadequate as an account of the moral force of promising. Breaking a 
promise, most of us think, is typically wrong and not merely non-virtuous. 
 Another possibility is that promising generates an impersonal duty on the part of the 
promisor to keep her promise. The duty is impersonal in the sense that it is owed to no one. It is 
wrong to break a promise, but no one has a right that one keep one’s promise. This comes much 
closer to capturing the common-sense moral force of promises, but it still seems inadequate. 
When, under normal circumstances, I fail to show up at the theater after promising you to do so, 
I wrong you. It is not—or at least not merely—an impersonal wrong. I owe you an apology and 
compensation. 
In what follows, I shall examine the question of whether promising generates a duty to 
the promisee to perform the promised act. Throughout, I shall understand permissibility, 
obligation, duties, rights, etc. in their pro tanto (all else being equal) sense. We shall thus be 
concerned with the question of whether there is at least a pro tanto duty owed to the promisee to 
keep promises. More specifically, we shall focus on the question of whether there is a (pro tanto) 
natural moral right to have promises made to one kept. I shall thus not be concerned with social 
practice (institutional) accounts of the obligation to keep promises (according to which there is 
such an obligation when one participates in the right way in certain social practices)1 nor with 
instrumental accounts (e.g., rule contractarian or rule utilitarian accounts)2. 
I shall distinguish two broad conceptions of promising and explore their very different 
implications concerning the status of the requirement to keep one’s promises.  
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2. The Normativized Conception of Promising  
I shall distinguish between normativized and non-normativized conceptions of promising. On the 
non-normativized conception—which we will explore more fully in the next section—the nature 
of promising does not conceptually entail any connection with the obligation to keep promises. A 
promise might be understood, for example, as an assertion that one will do something along with 
special assurance that one will do so and an invitation to rely on that assurance. It may, as a 
matter of fact, be wrong to break promises so understood, but such wrongness is not built into 
the concept of promising on this conception. Promising on this view is like killing, which is also 
a non-normativized concept. Even if one believes that killing is always wrong, this is not part of 
the concept of killing. 
  On the normativized conception of promising, on the other hand, the wrongness of 
breaking a promise is part of the concept of promising in roughly the same way that the 
wrongness of murder is part of the concept of murder understood as wrongful intentional killing. 
More specifically, a promise is made, on the normativized conception, when an agent validly 
offers to undertake an obligation to the promisee to perform some act (i.e., give up a liberty-right 
in relation to her) and the promisee validly accepts the offer. Here are some sample statements of 
normativized conceptions: 
 
I take it that promising is, by definition, an act of placing oneself under an obligation.3 
(Searle 1964, p. 45) 
 
According to the second [the obligation conception of a promise], promises are 
expressions of intentions to undertake obligations.4 …  
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To promise is, on this conception, to communicate an intention to undertake by the very 
act of communication an obligation to perform a certain action.5 
 
Normative Power View: Promising is the exercise of the power to effect a normative 
requirement that one carry out a course of conduct by communicating one’s intention to 
undertake, by that very act of communication, an obligation so to act.6 
 
Word-Giving Thesis: If Y gives her word that a certain proposition is true [e.g., promises 
that she will do something], then X thereby acquires a claim against Y to its being true. ... 
Assertion Thesis: Y gives X his or her word that a proposition is true if and only if Y 
asserts the proposition to X, and (i) in so doing, Y is inviting X to rely on its truth, and 
(ii) X receives and accepts the invitation (there is uptake). …  
There is nothing deeper that either needs or can be said about how word-givings 
generally and promisings in particular generate claims. Their moral force lies in their 
generating claims; and the fact that they do generate claims is explained by the fact that 
issuing an invitation is offering to bind oneself; so that when the invitation is accepted, 
the offer is accepted, and one therefore is bound.7 
 
The normativized conception of promising is a family of views. One dimension of 
variation concerns the normative perspective from which the obligation applies. The two main 
possibilities of interest here are morality and the law. The moralized version holds that a 
promising is validly offering to undertake a moral obligation to the promisee to perform some 
act, which the promisee validly accepts. The legalized version holds that promising is validly 
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offering to undertake a legal obligation, which is validly accepted by the promisee. The legalized 
version is of interest if the purpose is to give an account of legally binding contracts understood 
as exchanges of promises. Here, however, I am concerned with the moral obligation to keep 
promises and hence I shall focus on the moralized version.8 
On the moralized conception, there is no mystery about how promising generates a moral 
obligation to the promisee. It is simply part of the meaning of “promising” so understood that it 
generates such an obligation. It is, however, an open question whether anyone has ever made a 
promise! The answer depends on whether anyone ever placed herself under an obligation in the 
specified manner. Promising, on this conception, requires that a valid offer be made and this 
requires that: 
1. one is at moral liberty with respect to the promisee to perform the promised act; 
2. one has the moral power—by giving valid consent—to relinquish that liberty and give 
someone a claim-right against one that one perform that act; 
3. one gives consent; 
4. the conditions under which the consent is given (e.g. freely and informedly) make the 
consent valid. 
Moreover, promising requires that the offer be validly accepted and this requires that: 
5. one has the moral power to acquire a claim-right against the promisor that she perform 
that act by giving valid consent to a valid offer; 
6. one gives consent; 
7. the conditions under which the consent is given (e.g. freely and informedly) were valid. 
 
If any of these conditions fails, then a moralized promise has not been made, and no obligation 
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has been generated. If individuals do not have the right kinds of rights (the liberties and powers 
above) or do not exercise them under the right conditions, then there are no promises; there are 
only purported promises.9 
 The moralized conception of promising is very different from the common-sense notion. 
Still, it’s a legitimate notion, and it’s perfectly acceptable to ask whether promising so 
understood generates an obligation to the promisee. The answer, we have seen, is that by 
definition it does.  
I believe that individuals have certain natural rights, and that these include the rights of 
full self-ownership and the powers to acquire rights over others by consensual transfer. If this is 
so, then there often are moralized promisings and these generate obligations to the promisee. Full 
self-ownership is simply a special case of full private ownership. Full private ownership of an 
object consists roughly of a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control rights over the 
use of the object—both the liberty-right to use and the security-right against others using without 
one’s permission, (2) rights to compensation if someone uses the object without one’s 
permission, (3) enforcement rights (to prevent the violation of these rights or to extract 
compensation owed for past violation), (4) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, 
rental, gift, or loan), and (5) immunity to the non-consensual loss of any of the rights of 
ownership.10 For the present purposes, the (control) security-rights, the rights to compensation, 
and the enforcement rights can be ignored. What matters for the promising issue is that an agent 
have: (1) the (control) liberty-right to perform the promised action, (2) the right (power) to 
transfer that right to someone else (thereby losing the liberty-right not to perform it and giving 
the other person a claim-right to its performance), and (3) a reasonably robust immunity to the 
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non-consensual loss of these rights (so that agents typically have the previous two rights if they 
have not consensually transferred them away). 
Obviously, even this weak form of self-ownership would be controversial if it were 
advocated (as I would) as an all-things-considered view. Here, however, we are only concerned 
with pro tanto moral obligations, and hence we only need these self-ownership rights to be pro 
tanto rights. Of course, some might object to them even in the pro tanto form, but most, I think, 
would accept them in this form. In any case, I shall not attempt her to defend the view. The 
important point is that, if full self-ownership and the power to acquire rights by transfers are 
granted, and one assumes (as seems plausible) that the rights of transfer are often exercised under 
valid conditions (e.g., freely and informedly), it follows that moralized promises are often made. 
From that, it follows immediately that individuals often acquire moral obligations to perform 
their promised acts. 
In short, if full self-ownership is granted, then it is clear that typically individuals owe an 
obligation to their promisees to keep their moralized promises. Let us now consider the non-
normativized conception of promising, which is, I believe, much closer to the common-sense 
view. 
 
3. The Non-Normativized Conception of Promising 
On the non-normativized conception of promising, the fact that a promise was made does not 
conceptually entail anything about obligations of any sort—and nothing about moral obligations 
in particular. There may be a valid moral principle that entails that promisors sometimes, or even 
always, have a moral obligation to keep their promises, but any such obligation does not follow 
from the mere fact that a promise was made. It also requires that some related moral principle 
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about promising be true. 
 There are many versions of the non-normativized conception, but a strong version—one 
that is especially likely to generate an obligation—might hold that A promises B that she will 
perform some future action just in case (1) A asserts that she will do so, (2) she thereby 
expresses a firm intention to do so, (3) she assures B that she will do so, (4) she invites B to rely 
on this assurance, (5) B accepts this invitation, and (6) the above is common knowledge between 
the two parties. Perhaps not all these elements are essential, and perhaps there are some 
additional necessary conditions, but the general idea should be clear. Promising in this sense 
leaves open as a conceptual matter whether the promisor has an obligation (of any sort) to the 
promisee to do as promised. 
 Here are two examples of non-normativized conceptions: 
 
According to the first [intention conception of promises], promises are expressions of 
firm intentions to act.11 
  
[P]romising as a speech act will here be explained as an utterance of the speaker’s about 
his own future conduct which is essentially characterized by the speaker’s intending his 
addressee to take it as being intended to induce the addressee to rely upon the speaker’s 
taking the action in question.12 
 
On the non-normativized conception, then, the fact that an action breaks a promise may 
provide a moral reason not to perform it, but it is not part of the concept of promising that there 
is some moral reason to keep it. On the moralized conception, on the other hand, to say that an 
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action breaks a promise just is to assert that there is a moral reason owed to the promisee not to 
perform that action. 
On any reasonable non-normativized conception of promising, promising often takes 
place. All that is necessary is (roughly) that the appropriate assertion, assurance, and invitation 
be made and that the invitation to rely upon the assurance and taken up. The question then arises 
as to whether there is a (pro tanto) moral obligation to the promisee to perform the promised 
action. Do individuals have, that is, a (pro tanto) moral right against promisors to have non-
normativized promises made to them kept? Different moral theories give different answers. Act 
utilitarianism, for example, denies that there are rights at all and thus holds that there is no such 
right (although it will, of course, be indirectly sensitive to the importance of keeping promises). 
Social practice views can hold that one has a right to have promises kept if one participates in the 
right kind of way in the right kind of social practice of promising. Instrumental ruled-based 
theories of morality, such as rule utilitarianism and rule contractualism, can, and probably do, 
recognize a right to have promises kept. Our focus, however, is on natural rights. Is there a 
natural right to have non-normativized promises made to one kept? 
One possibility is that the natural rights of self-ownership somehow include the right to 
have non-normativized promises made to one kept. Self-ownership includes security rights that 
make it impermissible for others to physically use one’s person (touching, striking, etc.) without 
one’s permission. Perhaps these security rights also make it impermissible for others to mentally 
use one’s person in certain ways without one’s permission. After all, the person that one owns 
(oneself) is not merely a physical thing. It is also a mental thing. Ownership of a physically 
embodied mental thing arguably gives one some rights over it that one would not have if it were 
merely a physical thing. Perhaps there are certain ways of “messing with a person’s mind” that 
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are incompatible with her security ownership rights over her mind. Perhaps subliminal hypnosis, 
certain kinds of deception, certain kinds of emotional harms, and threats to wrongfully harm are 
such ways of messing with a person’s mind. If so, then perhaps breaking a non-normativized 
promise also is. 
In the abstract, I find this possibility plausible. I have, however, been unable to come up 
with a general account of “mental use” (or “messing with a person’s mind”) that would plausibly 
be precluded by ownership rights over a mental being. It can’t just involve having one’s mind 
altered. Almost everything others do does that. When you walk by me in a public park, your 
action typically alters my beliefs about the world. Any mental use that self-ownership precludes 
must be restricted to actions that alter one’s mental state in ways that undermine or by-pass one’s 
mental capacities, or something like that. It’s not clear, however, what a general account of 
mental use would look like. 
Even if self-ownership does not entail a right to have non-normativized promises kept, 
there may still be a natural right to have them kept. Agents have more rights than just self-
ownership rights (e.g., rights to acquire property rights in other things). It may be that agents 
have certain communication rights against other communicators simply in virtue of their both 
being communicators. In what follows, I shall briefly explore this possibility—leaving open 
whether this follows from full self-ownership or not. 
As indicated above, merely having one’s beliefs altered by another (as when you walk 
past me) does not violate one’s self-ownership or any other natural right that one has. Nor, does 
having one’s beliefs damaged (i.e., altered in an undesirable way). You violate no right of mine 
when you walk past me wearing a tuxedo and I form the false belief that you are going to a 
wedding. Nor, I think, are any rights violated when one’s beliefs are damaged by the assertions 
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of others. You violate no right of mine when you falsely assert to me that Smith is going to a 
wedding and I believe you. Asserting would be far too risky if there were such a right. Things 
may, however, be different, if we limit our attention to those assertions that are accompanied by 
a special guarantee—giving one’s word. If the assertor explicitly says “You have my word”, “I 
warrant it to be true” or “I swear that it is true”, then it is not so clearly unreasonable to hold her 
accountable for the truth of her assertion when someone takes her at her word (i.e., treats the 
special guarantee as having the right kind of significance). Such accountability imposes no 
unreasonable liability on assertors, since they need not give their word, and effective 
communication would seem to require that those who give their words be accountable for the 
truth of their assertions. 
There is, of course, the important question of what it is to give one’s word. Just as there is 
a distinction between normativized and non-normativized promising, there is a distinction 
between normativized and non-normativized word-giving. To give one’s word in the moralized 
(normativized) sense is something like having a valid offer to undertake certain obligations—
should a specified proposition be false—to the word-receiver validly accepted by her. Here, 
however, we are concerned with the non-moralized sense. 
 What is it to give one’s word in a non-moralized sense? Obviously, there are many 
different accounts. The crucial feature, however, is that some kind of special assurance is given 
for the truth of the assertion. It is something like assertion under heightened standards for 
assertion. The word-giver is expressing her confidence in the truth of the proposition—not 
merely for everyday contexts of assertion, but also—for contexts in which the truth of the 
proposition is especially important. Moreover, she is not merely expressing her heightened 
confidence; she is also in some sense inviting the other to rely upon it. Much more needs to be 
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said on this topic, but I shall not explore this further here. 
 It seems plausible that agents have certain communication rights against those who give 
them their word. (Indeed, something like this may follow from a proper understanding of the 
mental aspects of full self-ownership.) One can give one’s word for any proposition (e.g., that it 
rained in Hong Kong yesterday). Promising, on a particularly important non-normativized 
conception, is simply the act of giving one’s word that one will perform some future action.13 
Rights against promisors, on this conception, are simply special cases of rights against word-
givers. 
Much more careful discussion is needed of whether individuals really do have rights 
against word-givers. Here, I shall simply assume that this is so and explore the content of such 
rights. Suppose that I give you my word that my car is in my garage. What rights do you have 
against me? It seems plausible that you have a right that, if this is false: (1) I alert you as soon as 
discover the word-given proposition is not true, (2) I apologize to you for my mistake, and (3) I 
compensate you for relevant damages.14 The important point is that, in general, word-receivers 
do not seem to have a right against word-givers that, if possible, they make the word-given 
proposition true. You do not, it seems, have a right against me that I place my car in my garage 
merely because I gave my word that it was there. You may well have the above three rights, but 
you don’t, it seems plausible, have that one. If, as we are supposing, promises are simply special 
cases of word-giving, then it would also seem that promisees do not generate rights against 
promisors that they perform the promised actions. Promisees may well have (1) a right to be 
alerted, if the promisor realizes that he will not perform the promised action, (2) a right to an 
apology, and (3) a right to compensation, but, on this (non-normativized) conception of 
promising, promisees arguably do not have a right to have the promised action performed. 
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Obviously, the issue is complex and requires much more discussion. The above account 
is meant to be merely suggestive of what a plausible non-normativized account of promising 
might look like. The speculation is that there is no natural right non-normativized promises kept, 
if promising is simply a special cases of word-giving. Clearly, there are other possible non-
normativized accounts, and I have not ruled out the possibility that there is a natural right to have 
promises kept on some such account. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Because I believe that agents have (1) the requisite liberty-rights of action and power-rights to 
renounce such liberty-rights and give someone else a claim-right against that action, and (2) the 
requisite powers to acquire claim-rights over others by consensual transfer, I believe that agents 
can and do make moralized promises. Keeping such promises is morally obligatory by definition. 
Most of what people want to accomplish from promising can be accomplished by moralized 
promising. 
Still, it is an interesting question as to whether individuals also have the right to have 
non-normativized promises kept—even when they do not correspond to any normativized 
promise. The idea that agents have certain rights against those who give them their word that 
certain propositions are true seems quite plausible (and may well follow from full self-
ownership15). A particularly attractive and relevant non-normativized account of promising takes 
promising simply to be giving one’s word concerning one’s future conduct. In general, giving 
one’s word to a proposition does not, it seems, give the word-receiver a right that, if possible, 
one make the proposition true. Promising as special cases of word-giving thus seems to generate 
certain rights, but not the right to have the promised action performed. If this is right (and greater 
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analysis is needed), then this is an important difference between moralized promising and this 
particularly attractive non-normative conception of promising.16 
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